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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE CITY OF SALT LAKE, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEAN FRED VENORD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20030501-CA 
Appellant is Incarcerated 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a conviction for Alcohol-Related Recklessness, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (Supp. 2003), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, Judge, 
presiding.1 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue: Under section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, a prisoner may compel a 120-day 
disposition of a pending charge by giving the warden or other appropriate agent a written 
1
 A copy of the Minutes of the "Change of Plea; Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is 
attached in Addendum A. 
request for disposition. The request must give the nature of the charge and the name of 
the court where the charge is pending. In this case, Appellant Jean Fred Venord met these 
requirements, but the State failed to prosecute him within 120 days. Did the trial court err 
in failing to dismiss the case? 
Standard of Review: Overall, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard to a 
trial court's decision about whether to dismiss charges under the 120-day disposition 
statute. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, Tf3, 34 P.3d 790. However, underlying 
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, and underlying findings of fact are 
reviewed for clear error. Id. at ^ [4. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 100-06; 119-22; 160 [2-6]. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to the issue on 
appeal. The Amendment reads, in pertinent part: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public t r i a l . . . . 
U.S. Const. Amend VI. 
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution is relevant to the issue on appeal. 
The provision reads, in pertinent part: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the r ight . . . to have a speedy 
public t r i a l . . . . 
2 
UT Const, art. I, § 12. 
Section 77-29-1 of the Utah Code, "Disposition of Pending Charge," is 
determinative of the issue on appeal. The text of that statute is attached in Addendum B. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The chronology of events is critical to the issue, so the proceedings are listed in 
order as follows: 
July 6, 2000 Mr. Venord is charged by Information with 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. R. 
2. 
August 17, 2000 Mr. Venord fails to appear for arraignment 
and an Arrest Warrant is issued.2 
December 12, 2001 A pretrial conference is held, but neither the 
prosecutor nor the defense attorney appear. 
R.23. 
December 17, 2001 
December 25, 2001 
A pretrial conference is held, but the 
prosecutor does not appear. R. 27. 
Mr. Venord writes the court a letter, stating 
that he is in the Utah County Jail and will 
not be able to attend a pretrial conference 
scheduled for January 7, 2002 because he 
has a court date in Provo at the same time. 
R.33. 
January 7, 2002 A pretrial conference is held, and Mr. 
Venord does not appear. Another bench 
2
 R. 5. Another warrant was issued two months later, on October 6, 2000 when Mr. 
Venord failed to appear for a pretrial conference. R. 17. 
3 
warrant is issued. R. 35-37. 
May 6, 2002 
June 5,2002 
June 12, 2002 
October 1,2002 
October 9,2002 
October 15, 2002 
October 23, 2002 
A pretrial conference is held, and jury trial is 
scheduled for June 12, 2002. R. 46. 
Mr. Venord files a Motion to Dismiss on the 
basis that he was already convicted of 
charges arising from the same criminal 
episode. R. 47-65. 
Trial is continued to July 12, 2002 on 
stipulation of counsel. R. 84. However, trial 
is not held on July 12 th for reasons not 
apparent from the record. 
From the Utah County Jail, Mr. Venord 
executes and delivers a "Notice and Request 
for Disposition of Pending Charges ," 
specifying this case by charge and case 
number. R. 88. 
Jolie Williams of the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office forwards the Notice, along with a 
letter stating that she received the Notice on 
October 1st, to the Salt Lake City Attorney's 
Office & Salt Lake District Court. R. 87-88. 
The Utah County Jail receives a reply from 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
stating that Mr. Venord "has no pending 
charge(s) in Salt Lake County being 
prosecuted by the Salt Lake County District 
Attorney's Office." R. 90. 
Mr. Venord submits an "Inmate Request and 
Grievance Form" to the jailers, expressing 
concern because he had not received 
acknowledgment of his request for 120-day 
disposition in this case. R. 89. 
4 
October 28, 2002 
January 23, 2003 
January 24, 2003 
February 6, 2003 
March 11, 2003 
March 31, 2003 
The jail responds that the Notice was sent to 
Salt Lake, and attached a copy of the reply 
received from the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office. R. 89-90. 
Mr. Venord submits another "Inmate 
Request and Grievance Form" to the jailers, 
stating that he had received notice there was 
a warrant on this case, so he re-filed the 
disposition notice, but had not received 
anything back. He expresses his concern 
that jailers have made mistakes in the 
forwarding process. R. 91. 
The Jail responds that Mr. Venord should be 
more respectful in his requests. Id. 
Jury trial is set for March 11, 2003. R. 92. 
Mr. Venord makes a Motion to Dismiss for 
failure to prosecute within 120 days. R. 98. 
The court requests briefing. Id. 
Mr. Venord files a "Motion with Inclusive 
Memorandum to Dismiss" on the basis that 
the State failed to prosecute him within 120 
days of his written request for disposition. 
R. 100-06. 
April 11,2003 
April 23, 2003 
Court denies the Motion to Dismiss, opining 
that Mr. Venord should have done 
something to correct the jail's error in 
sending the Notice to the wrong court, R. 
160 [3-4], and noting that he had some 
failures to appear. Id. at 5. 
Mr. Venord files a "Motion to Reconsider 
Denials of Motion to Dismiss," pointing out 
that the State has made no showing that it 
did not receive the Notice of Disposition, 
5 
and even if it didn't receive it, the jail's 
failure to properly forward it doesn't 
constitute good cause for failing to bring 
Mr. Venord to trial within 120 days. R. 119-
22. The motion is denied. 
May 5, 2003 Mr. Venord enters a conditional plea to the 
charge of Alcohol-Related Recklessness on 
condition that he may appeal. R. 136. 
May 7, 2003 Mr. Venord is sentenced for Alcohol-
Related Recklessness. R. 139, 162-63. 
June 4, 2003 Mr. Venord files a timely Notice of Appeal. 
R. 141. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts are not pertinent to the issue in this case. However, the general facts are 
as follows: 
At approximately 746 N. Irving Street in Salt Lake City, Mr. Venold was 
allegedly operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated. R. 
2. The Information alleges that a blood or breath test showed he had a "blood or breath 
alcohol content of .08 grams or greater by weight as shown by a chemical test given 
within two hours after the alleged operation or physical control " Id. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erred by failing to dismiss this case after the prosecutor missed the 
6 
120-day prosecution deadline imposed upon him under the 120-day disposition statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999). Under section 77-29-1, a 120-day deadline is imposed 
once an imprisoned criminal defendant prisoner properly executes and delivers a written 
request for 120-day disposition of a charge against him. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) 
(1999). In this case, Mr. Venord did this. He requested a 120-day disposition in writing, 
and specified not only the charge and court, as required by section 77-29-1(1), but also 
the case number. R. 88. He then delivered the request to an agent of the jail where he was 
incarcerated, as required by section 77-29-1(1). The agent then documented her receipt 
of the request. R. 87. Yet, the prosecutor did nothing to forward this case, and by the 
120-day deadline, this case was still pending. So, this case should have been dismissed. 
However, the trial court did not dismiss this case, and ruled instead that Mr. 
Venord should have done something more to ensure that the jail properly forwarded his 
Notice to the appropriate prosecuting agency and court. R. 160 [3-5]. But this ruling is 
patently wrong. Indeed, it ignores the 120-day disposition statute and all of the 
interpretive case law. To begin with, the 120-day disposition statute indicates that, once a 
criminal defendant properly executes and delivers a request for 120-day disposition, his 
task is over. The burden then shifts to the "warden, sheriff, or custodial officer" to 
forward the request to the prosecuting attorney and court clerk, and to the prosecuting 
attorney to prosecute within 120 days. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2), (3) & (4) (1999). 
Certainly, the prisoner has no obligation to see that the warden, sheriff, or custodial 
7 
officer properly forwards his request. Nor does the prisoner have an obligation to ensure 
that the request is properly filed in the prosecutor's office and court. The prisoner has no 
control over these things, and his inability to ensure that they happen cannot work to 
deprive him of his speedy trial rights embodied in section 77-29-L 
What is more, the prosecutor's burden to move the case forward is not excused 
simply because of administrative errors or other glitches in the system. State v. Heaton. 
958 P.2d 911, 915 (Utah 1998); State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah 1991); State 
v. Wagenman. 2003 UT App 146, f l4, 71 P.3d 184; State v. Coleman. 2001 UT App 
281, f 14, 34 P.3d 790. This is not only well-settled legally, it is also sound policy. The 
purpose of section 77-29-1 is to compel the prompt prosecution of charges against 
prisoners so that jailers, sheriffs, the prosecutor's office, and others cannot hold charges 
over prisoners' heads. State v. Lindsay. 2000 UT App 379, [^6, 18 P.3d 504; State v. 
Viies, 702 P.2d 1175, 1176 (Utah 1985). But this is precisely what would happen if 
administrative errors could be used to excuse the prosecutor from his burden to prosecute 
within 120 days. So, administrative errors should not be used to justify the failure to 
prosecute. 
In short, the trial court should have dismissed this case on the basis that the 
prosecutor failed to prosecute this case within 120 days after Mr. Venord executed and 
delivered his written request for 120-day disposition. The prosecutor failed to show good 
8 
cause for the failure to prosecute,3 and nothing else excused the failure to prosecute. So, 
the case should have been dismissed with prejudice.4 
ARGUMENT 
MR VENORD'S CONVICTION SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE 
THE CITY DID NOT BRING HIM TO TRIAL WITHIN 120 DAYS OF HIS 
REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF THE CHARGE 
The trial court should have dismissed the DUI charge against Mr. Venord because 
the prosecutor did not demonstrate good cause in open court for its failure to bring Mr. 
Venord to trial within 120 days after he delivered a 120-day disposition request to 
jailers.5 Indeed, the prosecutor proffered absolutely nothing to show why Mr. Venord 
was not tried before the 120-day deadline. Instead, he simply argued in a memorandum 
that the duty to prosecute never attached because he was not personally aware of the 120-
day disposition request. R. 111. Further, during the hearing on the 120-day disposition 
issue, the prosecutor said absolutely nothing on the issue. R. 160 [2-6]. The discussion 
took place entirely between the defense counsel and trial court, and focused on the 
actions of the jailers after they received Mr. Venord's 120-day disposition request. IdL at 
3
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) & (4) (1999) (prosecutor's failure to prosecute within 
120 days may be justified by "good cause shown in open court "). 
4
 See Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999) (if charge not prosecuted within 120 days and 
no good cause excuses the delay, "the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.") 
5
 A copy of the request and the jail's notification letter to the prosecutor and court is 
included in Addendum C. 
9 
3-6. Ultimately, the court decided not to dismiss the case, citing the prosecutor's 
implication in his memorandum that he was not aware of the request. Id_ at 5. However, 
the 120-day disposition statute and interpretive case law contradict this ruling. 
The 120-day disposition statute, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1999), stems from 
federal and state constitutional rights to a speedy trial,6 and is meant to "more precisely 
define what is meant by speedy trial " State v. Lindsay. 2000 UT App 379, [^6, 18 
P.3d 504 (citations omitted). More practically, the statute also prevents law enforcers 
from "holding over the head of a prisoner undisposed of charges against him." Id . 
(citations omitted). Further, it compels prompt prosecution,7 and encourages trials "while 
witnesses are available and their memories are fresh." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, f6 
(citations omitted). 
These goals are implicit in the words of the statute. The statute provides that, 
whenever a prisoner has a pending charge, the prisoner may compel the prosecutor to try 
him within 120 days by delivering a written request to the warden or other authorized 
person: 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there 
is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or 
information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a 
6Statev.Viles. 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 313 
(Utah 1975). 
7Viles,702P.2datll76. 
10 
written demand specifying the nature of the charge and the court wherein it 
is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall be 
entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of 
delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, 
to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff 
or custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so 
notified, provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of 
commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) & (2) (1999). 
Besides outlining the procedure for making a 120-day disposition request, this 
statute also makes clear that, once the request is made, the defendant's obligation under 
the statute is over. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, fl4, 34 P.3d 790; State v. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991). At that point, the prosecutor has the burden of 
pushing the case forward to meet the deadline. IcL_ This means that the prosecuting 
agency may not stand passively by while clerical errors delay the case, or while time 
simply passes. State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,915 (Utah 1998). The prosecuting agency 
must schedule all necessary appearances within the 120-day period, and inform the court 
that prompt scheduling is necessary because of the 120-day disposition notice. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281,1fl4; Petersen. 810 P.2d 425. The prosecutor must also actively avoid 
delays, and if the delays are necessary, the prosecutor must minimize them. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281, f l4; Petersen. 810 P.2d 425. 
To be sure, the statutory burden to move the case forward sometimes places the 
11 
prosecutor in a difficult position. For instance, the prosecutor has an obligation, in some 
circumstances, to anticipate a 120-day disposition notice when one has not yet been 
received.8 Further, administrative errors or other glitches, even if they are unknown to the 
prosecutor, do not excuse the failure to prosecute within 120 days. The Utah Supreme 
Court has emphasized this at least twice. In State v. Heaton the Court declared: 
The mere fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor has never 
been considered dispositive because "to hold that good cause is supported 
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the prosecutor would 
contradict the language in section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of 
complying with the statute on the prosecution." 
Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915 (quotations deleted). Before that, in State v. Petersen , the Court 
said: 
In any event, to hold that good cause is supported by the lone fact that the 
delay was not caused by the prosecutor would contradict the language in 
section 77-29-1(4) which places the burden of complying with the statute 
on the prosecution. 
Petersen, 810 P.2d at 426. So, even though the prosecutor may sometimes feel frustrated 
8
 See Coleman, 34 P.3d at 796-97 (holding that period of delay occurring when defendant 
requested that the preliminary hearing be held 30 days from the date of his request, rather than 
within 10 days of his arrest was not justified by good cause. The Court explained: 
The State knew that this request might precede or come in conjunction with 
Defendant's Notice, which would initiate running of the 120-day period. Further, 
the State knew that upon delivery of Defendant's Notice, the Speedy Trial Statute 
"clearly places the burden of complying with the statute on the prosecutor. 
Nevertheless, the prosecution did not object, request a finding that the delayed 
preliminary hearing constituted a delay attributable to Defendant, or make any 
motion regarding Defendant's request." 
(quotations omitted)). 
12 
by outside events, the burden nonetheless applies. 
Of course, the prosecutor is not without reasonable recourse. The 120-day 
disposition statute allows for delays which are shown by the prosecutor to have good 
cause. The statute says: 
After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown 
in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be 
granted any reasonable continuance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(3) (1999). The question becomes, therefore, whether any 
delays are supported by good cause. This has been the principal issue in several appeals 
under the 120-day disposition statute, and some general guidelines have emerged. Most 
importantly, it has been determined that a good-cause delay is one that is either: (1) 
caused by the defendant, or (2) "a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen problems 
arising immediately prior to trial." Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ [14; Petersen, 810 P.2d 
at 426. 
As a practical matter, some good-cause delays have included those caused by 
defendants' motions,9 those made to accommodate defense counsels' schedules,10 and 
those caused by defendants' requests for continuances. State v. Phathammavong, 860 
P.2d 1001,1004-05 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); State v. Bullock. 699 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 
1985). On the other hand, delays that do not have good cause, and therefore do not 
9
 State v. Maestas. 815 P.2d 1319,1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
10
 Coleman, 2001 UT App 281,1f8. 
13 
justify bringing a defendant to trial after the 120-day period, include those caused by 
court administrative errors,11 those caused by a prosecutor's inaction,12 and those caused 
by a prosecutor's passive acceptance of delayed scheduling. Coleman. 2001 UT App 
28l,1fl4. 
If a delay is not justified by good cause, the trial court is obligated to dismiss the 
case with prejudice: 
In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves 
to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court 
finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a 
previous motion for continuance was made or not, the court shall order the 
matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). 
Finally, appellate review of this issue involves a two-step process. First, it should 
be determined when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired. Second, if the 
trial was held outside the 120-day period, it must be determined whether "good cause" 
excused the delay. Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, %6; Heaton. 958 P.2d at 916. If it did 
not, the conviction must be reversed whether there is a showing of prejudice or not. 
Petersen. 810 P.2d at 427. Each step of this process is examined in order below. 
11
 Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915. 
12
 Petersen. 810 P.2d at 426. 
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A. During the 120-dav Period. Which Began October 1, 2002 and Ended 
January 29,2003, the Prosecutor did Nothing to Forward this Case 
The first step of the process, determining when the 120-day period commenced 
and when it ended, is closely guided by the 120-day disposition statute and interpretive 
case law. Under the statute, a 120-day period begins on "the date of [the prisoner's] 
delivery of written notice" to the "warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any 
custodial officer in authority or any appropriate agent of the same " Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-29-1(1) (1999). Once the notice is delivered by the prisoner, "the prosecutor has an 
affirmative duty [from that point] to have the defendant's matter heard within the 
statutory period." Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915. 
In this case, Mr. Venord delivered his notice on October 1, 2002.n This is shown 
by the Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges, which bears the date of 
October 1, 2002. R. 88. It is also proved by the letter from Jolie Williams of the Utah 
County Jail to the Salt Lake City Attorney's Office and Salt Lake District Court. In the 
letter, Ms. Williams states that the Notice was delivered to her on October 1st: 
On the 1st day of October, 2002, Jean Venord delivered to me the attached 
demand for disposition. This demand is forwarded to you pursuant to 
Section 77-29-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, for such further 
action as you deem appropriate. 
R. 87. And so, the date of commencement of the 120-day period is October 1, 2002. 
13
 The trial court made no finding about the commencement date and ending date of the 
120-day period. R. 160 [3-6]. It simply ruled that the 120-day period never began because the 
prosecutor did not know about the Notice. Id. 
15 
Of course, it is possible to read into the record some small confusion about the 
date of commencement. A line at the bottom of the Notice states: "Received by: Jolie 
Williams Date: 10/9/02." R. 88. However, while this may appear to be inconsistent 
with Ms. Williams specific statement that Mr. Venord delivered the Notice to her on 
October 1st, it is actually not a contradiction when the circumstances are taken into 
account. October 9th is the date that Ms. Williams wrote the letter to the Salt Lake City 
Attorney's Office and Salt Lake District Court informing them that the 120-day 
disposition notice had been received. R. 87. So, the October 9 th date noted on the bottom 
of the Notice likely refers to the date that Ms. Williams processed the paperwork, not the 
date that she actually received the Notice. 
Taking the October 1st date, then, and adding 120 days shows that the State's 
deadline for bring Mr. Venord to trial was January 29, 2003.14 And, the record shows that 
Mr. Venord was not tried by that date. Indeed, the record shows that the prosecutor did 
absolutely nothing to schedule any type of court appearance or do anything to move the 
case forward between October 1st and January 29th. The last activity that occurred in this 
case before Mr. Venord delivered his notice on October 1st was the scheduling of a trial 
for July 12,2002. R. 84. However, for reasons not apparent from the record, trial was not 
held on that date, and no action was taken in this case until February 6, 2003, when a jury 
14
 This calculation includes thirty days in October, which does not include the date of 
October 1st itself; thirty days in November, thirty-one days in December, and twenty-nine days in 
January. 
16 
trial was set for March 11th. R. 92. In the meantime, the 120-day period had come and 
gone. 
Notably, even if the 120-day commencement date used is October 9, 2002, when 
Ms. Williams sent the letter and Notice, the 120-day deadline was still not met. This is 
because the October 9th date leads to the deadline date of February 6, 2002,15 and nothing 
happened in this case between October 9 th and February 6th. On February 6th, as earlier 
noted, a jury trial was set for March 11th, but nothing else appears in the record between 
October 9th and February 6th. 
Therefore, whichever commencement date is used, the unavoidable conclusion in 
this case is that the prosecuting agency failed to bring Mr. Venord to trial, or do anything 
at all to forward his case during the 120-day period. 
B. The Prosecutor has not Shown Good Cause for His Delay in Trying This 
Case 
Under the second part of the 120-day disposition review, it must be determined 
whether good cause justified the delay in prosecution, and in this case, there was no good 
cause.16 Indeed, this case sat for years with little effort on the part of the prosecutor to 
15
 This calculation includes 22 days in October, not counting the October 9th date, thirty 
days in November, thirty-one days in December, thirty-one days in January, and six days in 
February. 
16
 See Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^ [6 (any delays must be justified by good cause); 
Heaton, 958 P.2d at 916 (120-day disposition statute mandates that any delays must be justified 
by good cause). 
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bring it to trial. To be sure, the prosecutor may not have been at fault for some of the 
delay that occurred just after Mr. Venord was charged in July of 2000. This is because, 
during that time, Mr. Venord missed two or three court appearances. R. 5, 17, 33. 
However, the following year, appearances were missed by the prosecutor, defense 
counsel, or both. R. 23, 27, 35-37. Additionally, appearances were set unusually far 
apart. R. 5, 17, 23, 27, 33, 35-37. Not only that, but the first trial date was not even 
scheduled until June 12, 2002, two years after the Information was filed. R. 84. And 
then, trial was continued on stipulation of counsel. R. 84. Trial was rescheduled for July 
12, 2002. IcL However, trial was not held on that date, nor was it rescheduled. The 
reasons for this do not appear on record. But it is clear from the record that nothing 
happened on this case between July 12, 2002 until February 6, 2003 , when another jury 
trial was finally scheduled. R. 92. During this time the prosecutor did absolutely nothing 
to further the case. 
During this time, Mr. Venord did what he could to move the case along. He had 
been in jail since at least the end of November, 2001, R. 18, 27, 33, and so he was readily 
available for appearances. After the July 12, 2002 trial was missed, he patiently waited 
nearly three months. Then, on October 1, 2002, he finally executed and delivered a 
Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending Charges. R. 88. 
Notably, the Notice was properly executed and delivered. The Notice was in 
writing. Id Also, Mr. Venord did much more than simply list that he had a DUI in Salt 
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I aW Ht\ . as required under the 120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-
• i u ii^iea uic case number, the judge, and the charges, P 88 At that point:, 
imp had ilorn iTn'Yitiiiif1' rcquiM d ul liiiiii undei I he slaliile, iiiiid lit (Jul nui iiccil 10 do 
more. See I Jtah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999) (outlininr *tens 1.. 
delivery). Nonetheless, he attempted to follow up on his Notice to make sure it was being 
processed properly R 89, 91. Twice he filed an "Inmate Request and Grievance Form" 
asking aboi it the stati is of 1ms Mm!in i and lequcsting pi'opei deliver) R, N'J, {) I I u.wever 
he simply t a note fromjail prisunncl s«i s n it', "In 11 n • hiluir ill \umhl brhuuu' 
more respectful in your request" R. 91. 
Despite all of this, the trial court refused to dismiss this case, as required under the 
1
 »! d.i, disposition sUlule, I Kali 1 ode Ann. fc // W 11 11 I l'''HM Instead, the court ruled 
that the l?ll dav priiod iii'vct nil n In d Inn HUM (lit1 pmsmilui w is ufiim.'iii1 ul IS 
Venord's 120-day Notice. R. 160 [4]. In response, the defense counsel pointed out that, 
under the case of Slate v. Heaton, administrative errors do not excuse the prosecutor 
from complying \\ n;, :. . . ji,--ua* |H. riod. Id. However, the court opined that Heaton is - • 
distinguish a hit* from ilic lads ol (disease iiml ;aul lh.il Mi i i nuid should iiau d nit 
more to see that the jailers sent his Notice tu the proper" people. Id. at 4 -5 
This ruling is insupportable, T( is well-settled thai, under the 120-day disposition 
statute, a prisoner' s obligation ends once he complies with the notice requirements. That 
i • • custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same" a written demand for 120-day disposition 
specifying the nature of the charge and the court where the charge is pending. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1(1) (1999). At that point, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to try the case 
within 120 days. Heaton, 958 P.2d at 915; State v. Wagenman. 2003 UT App 146,1J14-
15, 71 P.3d 184; Coleman. 2001 UT App 281, fl4. And, it is the burden of the "warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer" to forward the request to the appropriate "prosecuting 
attorney and court clerk." Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999), and to the prosecutor to 
try this case within 120 days. 
The failure of these people to carry out their responsibilities under the statute 
cannot work to the disadvantage of Mr. Venord to deny him his speedy trial rights. Once 
he submitted his Notice, he no longer had any control over the processing of his request. 
He was neither capable of, nor responsible for, making sure his request was properly 
directed. 
This is precisely the reason that this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
emphasized that errors by jail agents, the sheriff, the prosecutor's office, or the court 
clerk in fulfilling their duties under section 77-29-1 are not considered good cause for 
delay. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 915; Wagenman. 2003 UT App 146,1J14-15; Coleman, 2001 
UT App 281, f 14. If such errors were considered good cause, then a defendant's right to 
a speedy trial could be routinely violated without recourse. Jail agents, sheriffs, clerks, 
the prosecutor's office, and others could either deliberately or inadvertently overlook 
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their delivery, filing, and notification duties, and effectively nullify the speedy trial right. 
And, this is what the legislature sought to avoid in enacting section 77-29-1. Lindsay , 
iNNin mi P i ;\(i(i i 'i 'In iiu.rnni m llnir iv|u I aimoi wnnl it mi in IIH UJI uays, and 
thereby deny a criminal defendant hi& 
•ii tliis case, it i> uncleai what sua oi adm ^^alive error occurred. Possibl), 
i> Salt LaU, i ay prosecutor's office or court received the Notice but did not 
i * j , ^w.i's- ., uic snenff 
ui publ office ioi t vbe the sher rt *• f 5 
to the correct prosecuting office and court.17 If that is the case, it appears that the District 
Attorney's Office erred in failing to inform the Salt Lake City prosecutor's office of the 
... lain.. ,,w^ not appear \iuii me service was done with 
120-day disposition statute. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2) (1999). Worse, the jail made 
no effort to respond to Mr. Veiiord's efforts to check on the status of the Notice and 
determine v hether it was properly delivered. R. 89, 91. 
However, the 
prosecuting offices and court clerks are inconsequential. W hat is clear is that Mi. v ciiord 
met the requirements of the 120-day disposition statute in executing and delivering his 
Notice, and yet the 1 !ity did nothing to move the case forward from, the date of 
1
' The letter itself was addressed to the proper cou.it of Salt Lake City, but delivered to the 
District Attorney's Office. R 87, 90. So, there may have been a delivery error. R. 87. 
commencement on October 1, 2002 to the 120-day deadline of January 29, 2003. Further, 
it made no showing of good cause for its failure to do so. And so, the prosecutor's breach 
of duty was unjustified. 
Finally, the trial court's comment that Heaton, which holds that clerical errors do 
not justify a failure to prosecute within 120 days, is distinguishable from this case is 
incorrect. The trial court acknowledged the Heaton case, but opined that clerical errors 
which keep the prosecutor from becoming personally aware of the 120-day disposition 
notice justify the failure to prosecute. The court stated: 
The Heaton case is "very [inaudible] distinguished from this case. The 
prosecution was aware of the 120 day disposition, but it was one of those 
cases that fell between the cracks and was passed from one Judge to the 
other. 
The prosecution was still aware of it and what the Court said in Heaton is, 
"Clerk error doesn't excuse by the Court, Doesn't excuse the prosecutor 
from following through and making sure that the 120 day disposition date 
is met." 
What it doesn't - it isn't a blank statement that regardless of who makes the 
error it is not just cause, because the Heaton case makes very clear that it 
was the prosecutor's responsibility to prosecute the case, and at least in that 
case the prosecutors were. Now, that's very different from this case. 
R. 160 [5]. 
However, contrary to this ruling, Heaton is actually directly on point. In Heaton, 
the defendant was charged with robbery and was appointed counsel from the public 
defender's office. Heaton. 958 P.2d at 913. He initially waived his preliminary hearing 
and pled not guilty at his arraignment. Id. Then he was placed in prison and delivered a 
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120-day disposition notice *. * ^ •• • • ents. Id_ On August 30th, about two months after 
his arrest, iw ma-.;.* ° n*quesi un a
 fn' *ry hearing and a date was set, IdL, The 
i'lniiiiiiii;i hrannj, w i in u "i |iii IUIN i ' iiiiii llu: Jcii iuldhl \\A\ IHHHIJ over. Id, A 
second arraignment was scheduled for September 27th, bul < HI lli.il il.ilr llu1 fl'dniiiiiiit 
asked 'the judge to recuse himself Id. The judge did so and ordered the case reassigned. 
Ill:, •' ' ' • 
11" 'i i Iv i k s »»| I it. «, ihe case was not reassigned 
Id. Instead, it simply sat unnoticed i intilthi nul Ini Mmi/inbci. Id. Ilitin .i uilniss uillcd 
the court asking about the trial date, and the court sent the parties a notice-of trial-
scheduling conference on December 7 th. IdL There, the court attempted to set a trial date 
I in I IIIIII in '< l1)"1" I nl 1 iiiiii pailics Inn! a scheduling eouflid anil so the dates oi'February 
16th and 17th were set, Id. Uilinmitniy Irml v\r« not lulil iiiiiil April Mlh mid ,l I J Id. 
On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that the court clerk's error in 
overlooking the case between September 27 th and the end of November did not constitute 
I'liHMl i. iiiist1 tor ihe l.fil'iuiT to prosecute. Heaton, 9.VS V2d at 915 (quotations deleted). 
This is because the 120-
forward on the prosecution: 
We agree with the State that it is not responsible lV mc administrative 
mistakes of the court. Nevertheless, it is responsible lor complying with 
section 11-29A. Because the statute places on the prosecutor alone Un-
burden of bringing the case to trial within the I ?.0-d;*v period, the 
prosecutor's duty must be independent of the ,l . docketing system... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
The Court then made two points. First, the prosecutor in that case was personally 
aware of the 120-day disposition statute but did nothing to move the case forward. Id_ 
Second, in any event, once a prisoner delivers his notice to an authorized agent, the 
prosecuting agency has an obligation to have the matter heard within the statutory time 
frame. Id This means the prosecutor must take an active role in scheduling appearances 
and moving the case along: 
When a prisoner delivers a written notice pursuant to the detainer statute, 
the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to have the defendant's matter heard 
within the statutory period. Implicit in this duty is the duty to notify the 
court that a detainer notice has been filed and to make a good faith effort to 
comply with the statute. This is not to say that the prosecutor must succeed, 
for "good cause" may support the prosecutor's failure to comply. However, 
where the prosecutor's failure is inaction - in this case, doing nothing 
whatsoever to bring Heaton's case to trial within the statutory period - the 
trial court may not conclude that the prosecutor's failure to supported by 
"good cause." 
H a t 915-16. 
Heaton is not distinguishable from this case because the fact patterns in both cases 
are similar. In fact, the delay caused by the prosecutor's inaction in this case was actually 
much more grievous than in Heaton. In Heaton the delay caused by the court's clerical 
error and the prosecutor's inaction was only about two months, from the September 27 * 
arraignment to the December 7th scheduling conference. Id. at 913. But in this case, 
nothing at all occurred between June 12, 2002, when trial was postponed, R. 46, and 
February 6,2003, when a new trial was finally scheduled. R. 92. During this nearly 
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eight-month period the 120-day disposition period came and went, and nothing 
happened. Indeed, this case was pending »<*r two years before that. R 2. The prosecutor's 
inaction in this CUM1 IS IIIIIIH II niun IIMIM I IIII.III in Hediun , and so Ihr loiin's opinion ih.it 
Heaton doesn't apply is insupportable. 
Of course, the Court in 1 leaton did note that the prosecutor in that case knew of 
..:. , , ^ disposition notice duiing thu period oi"clerical error, Heaton „ 958 P.2d at 
iiiiii rlpilinj^ush Heaton lioin llns i IM Iba HUSC, IN llns uise, 
there was never any evidence that the prosecutor did not receive the 1 ?i) day dispi IMIM HI 
notice. The only suggestion of this is in the prosecutor's "Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant s Motion Vi inclusive fvfemorandum to Dismiss." In that memorandum, the 
• - . - < • - • = ' • ^ t l i c i l e l d \ i n 
addressing the defendant's 120 da> no I www • nl \l 
request for action."18 However; this does not sho\. A^„ :; ; Lake City prosecutor's 
office did not receive the 120-day disposition notice. The notice may have been niisfiled, 
oi the prosecutoi may nol have reviewed I lie file during the period of delay. And, it was 
not shown in the motion hearing thai (he Nail I nkv ('ilv piostrnloi's oHuv did in I 
receive the notice. R , 160 [3-6], Certainly, the trial court did not make a specific factual 
finding as to that issue. Id And so, it cannot be assumed that the prosecutor's office did 
noti ecei\ e the notic z 
18
 I\ I 10 The prosecutor repeats this later in the memorandum R 111. 
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At any rate, whether the prosecutor received the notice is beside the point. Mr. 
Venord did everything required of him under section 77-29-1, R. 88, and so the burden 
shifted from him to the State to try with case within 120 days. Section 77-29-1 
specifically places the burden of notifying the prosecutor and court on the "warden, 
sheriff or custodial officer," and the burden of prosecuting within 120 days on the 
prosecutor. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(2), (3) & (4) (1999). If any of these people fail to 
perform their statutory obligations the case must be dismissed with prejudice. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (1999). 
This is clear from both Heaton and other holdings on the issue. For instance, in 
State v. Coleman this Court clarified that the prosecutor's statutory obligation to 
prosecute within 120 days attaches even when a prosecutor has not yet received a 120-
day disposition notice. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, f 14. In that case, the defendant 
delivered his notice to the prison agent on November 15th, and this court held that a delay 
occurring immediately after could not be justified even though the prosecutor had not yet 
received the notice. Id. This court explained: 
Simply put, the prosecution, knowing that it had or could soon have an 
obligation to bring the matter to trial within 120 days, may not passively 
accept a defendant's delay of the preliminary hearing, and then turn around 
and claim the delay kept the prosecution from meeting its burden. 
Id 
Further, in State v. Petersen, the Utah Supreme Court held that the prosecutor's 
failure to object to a trial date that was set more than 218 days after the commencement 
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date of the 120-day period was a breach of duty. Petersen, 810 P.2d at 424. As in Heaton, 
the court explained that the statutory duty to prosecute means that the prosecutor must 
lake it((iifiufi\ c .^t< |t' Li li'i .i H'H I\ illim Ilk. L'.ll da> period. IJJL Inaction does not 
excuse a delay. IdL This was emphasized again recentb in State \ , W ageiinian, \* hei e this 
Court reiterated that the duty to prosecute means the prosecutor must act affirmatively to 
try a case within the 120-day period and even anticipate the filing of a 120-day notice. 
5
 - ^ mucin, .iia so, under these cases, administrative errors 
cannot be user i l mlmih, In make ef'loil In In \ ,i rase w lllnii 
the 120-day period. 
All of this shows that, in this case, the prosecutor had no legally-acceptable 
slio'vi ring of good cause lor Ins lailure to try Mr. Venord within 120 days after he 
delivered a written n'(|i|i".'i IMI di^posilinn (in |,n| jguiis .'^'."InU'lv no ae I ion was taken 
on this case during the eight-month period that included the ! •':' !-<• pern nl,,, ,nwl ll i 
prosecutor did nothing to move the case forward. And so, the trial court should have 
dismissed this case with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. Venord respectfully requests that this Court reverse his 
conviction for failure to prosecute within 120 days after the written request for 
c 
SUBMITTED this $•* day of September, 2003. 
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Office as indicated above this day of September, 2003. 
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ADDENDUM A 
3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE ^F TTTAW 
.Al.'l I.AKI-; (MIT, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
JEAN FRED VENORD, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Cas- N 
Judge 
Date: 
' H K Q ; 2 ^ ~ V-
.ANTHONY B. 
May 7, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: 
Prosecutoj 
Defendant 
Defendant 
AUGUSTUS 
::>K^ Rr MICHAEL 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: December . 1968 
Video 
Tape Number: video Tape Count: 8:54 
CHARGES 
1. DUI REDUCE 
Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guxicy 
^
 x E L A T E D (amended) C] ass B 
i spos i t .1 on '.':-- 07/2 0 0 3 Gui 11y 
Court advises defendant :. iijir,. y a:-- penalM f js 
Defendan" waives *- irm- : •: sentence . 
Change- of Plea Note 
Deft signed waivei -sf rights. 
Pacn 
Case No: 005912689 
Date: May 07, 2003 
Credit is granted for time served. 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
Deft given CTS to close case. Order to release sentdown to the 
jail
 ( •^^OFfJSfy 
rfl " ' ' ~" 
L\) day of Dated t h i s 
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TJHJE COPY OF • „ 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE'ttf."tifej 4 
THIRD DISTRICT C6mV-&&r*&&E/\ 1 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH <fc7v> ' / i n / # i ' 
Page 2 ( las t ) 
ADDENDUM B 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 77-29-1 
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CHAPTER 29 
DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST 
PRISONERS 
Section 
77~29-1 
77-29-3. 
77-29-4. 
77-29-5. 
Prisoner's demand for disposition 
of pending charge — Duties of 
custodial officer — Continuance 
may be granted — Dismissal of 
charge for failure to bring to 
trial. 
Duty of custodial officer to inform 
prisoner of untried indictments 
or informations. 
Chapter inapplicable to incomp<-
tent persons. 
Escape of prisoner voids demanu 
Interstate agreement on detainers 
— Enactment into law — Text of 
agreement 
Section 
77-29-6. 
77 29-8. 
77-29-9. 
•1\) 1 1 
Interstate agreement - "Appro 
priate court" defined. 
Interstate agreement — Duty of 
state agencies and political sub-
divisions to cooperate. 
Interstate agreement — Applica-
tion of habitual criminal law. 
Interstate agreement — Escape of 
prisoner while in temporary 
custody. 
Interstate agreement - Duty of 
warden. 
Interstate agreement — Attorney 
general as administrator and 
information agent. 
77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending 
charge — Duties of custodial officer — Continu-
ance may be granted — Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial. 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving" a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be 
forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to 
the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commit-
ment of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds that 
the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 
ADDENDUM C 
Utah County Sheriff 
DAVID R. BATEMAN, SHERIFF 
Cover Letter 
NOTICE OF 120 DAY DISPOSITION 
TO.Salt Lake City Attorney's Office & Salt Lake District Court 
FROM: Jolie Williams 
DATE: October 9,2002 
On the 1st day of October, 2002, Jean Venord delivered to me the attached demand for 
disposition. This demand is forwarded to you pursuant to Section 77-29-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, for such further action as you deem appropriate. 
STREET ADDRESS: 3075 N. Main, Spanish Fork, Utah 84660 PHONE: (801)3454000 
UTAH COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE 
UTAH COUNTY JAIL 
NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION 
OF PENDING CHARGES 
TO: JAIL COMMANDER, UTAH COUNTY JAIL 
I, 0~£/f^ f, \jEAJOfcb , do hereby request that the Utah County Sheriffs 
Office forward a copy of this request for 120 day disposition of the following charges pending 
against me, pursuant to U.C.A 77-29-1: 
CHARGE CASE # COURT 
1. ft&etiJ SpA//*tf'/vC£ # pending in 
2. ^A^t^ra^(L #D0ft\ny) pendingin j&//*/*KB ' Y^W^ 
3. LOT # QOMiaifiW pendingin 5/3/f / * fc£ 
4. # pending in 
5. # pending in 
6. # pending in 
I request that you forward notice of this request to the appropriate prosecuting attorneys and 
court clerks by certified mail, return receipt requested, at my expense (charged to my inmate 
account). 
Dated this _£ day of Or/^Jer 20D7~. 
Irfmate's signature 
Received by: f A& I Q J i l bTCYT Date J U ^ I ^ 
